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has seen its standard of living decline
and its people suffer.”
Why the scramble for African oil? Because African oil is of high quality and
therefore relatively cheap to refine. Africa is surrounded by water, so access to
the sea and less expensive maritime
transport further reduces costs (in comparison to Central Asia, which must
ship by pipeline), and there is increasing global demand, in which Africa represents a larger percentage of new
discoveries and production. In addition, newly discovered offshore reserves
coupled with new ultra-deepwater drilling technology and transshipment directly from oil platforms avoids the
usual onshore problems.
Ghazvinian’s field work is based on
wide-ranging interviews with politicians, economists, warlords, diplomats,
aid workers, oil-company executives,
activists, priests, crude-oil bandits, soldiers, bureaucrats, technocrats, scientists, historians, oil-rig workers,
lawyers, bankers, old men, and boys,
among others. He provides comprehensive assessments on Nigeria, Gabon,
Cameroon, Congo, Angola, Equatorial
Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad,
and Sudan. Ghazvinian is quick to point
out that each country differs in terms of
the dynamics of the complex factors at
work. A few examples in his words:
“Nigeria, it is simply the doomsday scenario, an amalgamation of all the worst
oil has to offer Africa: corruption, ethnic
hatred, Dutch disease, and rentierism,
organized crime, militant rebellion,
hostage taking, and sabotage of industry activity, and a country held together
tenuously.”
“Gabon is the golden child ruled by a
self-interested French puppet who
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forgot to prepare his country for life after oil and has left it with a castrated
economy.”
“Cameroon and Congo are much the
same story, but in the latter country, oil
has fueled a bloody civil war that has
left the population traumatized and
afraid to speak out against the country’s
high-level corruption.”
“Angola is the sleeping giant where billions of dollars have disappeared and
where government maintains deep distrust of and distance from the international community.”
Ghazvinian concludes with a discussion
of the U.S. military’s increasing interest
in Africa, such as in the Gulf of Guinea
and the establishment of a new Africa
Command. He also details China’s
long-term strategy of gaining access to
oil by providing patient capital for oil
infrastructure in riskier areas coupled
with considerable development aid without the typical Western conditionality.
The reader will find this informative,
comprehensive, fast-paced journey to
Africa invaluable in better understanding the challenges and complexities of
the “curse of oil.”
RICHMOND M. LLOYD

Naval War College

Martel, William C. Victory in War: Foundations of
Modern Military Policy. New York: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2007. 446pp. $36.95

William Martel, formerly of the Naval
War College and now of the Fletcher
School at Tufts University, accomplishes
his chief goal of starting a discussion of
a worthy, intensely policy-relevant
topic. He demonstrates that a consensus

1

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

144

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 4, Art. 17

definition of the term “victory” remains
out of grasp, despite centuries of learned
commentary on military affairs. Martel
casts his book as a preliminary investigation of the nature of victory. This
“pre-theoretical” inquiry, he declares, is
the best that can be achieved, given the
nature of war—a violent clash of wills
pervaded by uncertainty and strong
passions. Given these realities, no socialscience theory can tell political and military officials how they can arrange
matters to assure victory.
After surveying the works of classical
and modern strategic theorists, Martel
constructs a framework for analyzing
past wars and informing future deliberations on when and how to use force to
achieve policy objectives. Victory, says
Martel, can be classified by: its level,
designated (in descending order) grand
strategic, political-military, or tactical;
how, and how much, the war alters the
prewar status quo; how fully the victorious society mobilizes itself for war;
and the manner and scope of postwar
obligations incurred by the victor. The
author next uses this framework to classify several U.S. military actions, ranging from the 1986 Libya raid to
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Evaluating victory is an ambiguous undertaking, even using this analytical approach. The Libya raid yielded only a
“quasi-political-military victory,” inducing a change of political behavior on
Moammar Gadhafi’s part. The outcome
of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, sure to engender the most controversy among
Martel’s case studies, remains in doubt.
While American policy makers are
clearly thinking in terms of a thoroughgoing, grand-strategic victory that reorders Middle Eastern affairs, only a
partial victory is yet in hand, and even
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that result could slip away amid
terrorism and communal bloodletting.
Victory in War renders a service by improving our ability to learn from past
operations and think through future
operations before embarking on them.
Given the preliminary nature of
Martel’s work, certain issues await elucidation. Most notably, the terms affixed to the levels of victory—grand
strategic, political-military, and tactical—
imply that the author wants to invert
the familiar Clausewitzian relationship
between policy and strategy. Placing
grand-strategic victory above politicalmilitary victory in the hierarchy suggests that strategy—roughly speaking,
“grand strategy” means deploying diplomatic, economic, and ideological as
well as military power to realize policy
aims—ranks above politics in the order
of things. A taxonomy clearly affirming
the supremacy of policy would enhance
Martel’s analytical enterprise and its
relevance to practitioners and scholars
considerably.
In short, Victory in War marks the beginning of what promises to be a fruitful debate on matters of vital interest to
political and military leaders—and the
nations they serve.
JAMES R. HOLMES

Naval War College

Prados, John. Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars
of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006. 696pp.
$35

In an era where overhead imagery is
available to anyone with a computer
and a credit card, where the twenty-fourhour cable news cycle drives government decisions and the Internet
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